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Abstract
This paper studies a strategic aspect of prot-sharing in an olig-
opolistic industry with a monopoly union. Whenever a uniform prot
share exists in the industry, we show that a union that values the
per worker remuneration positively, may have incentives to reduce
industry employment, decreasing thus total output and causing total
prots to increase. Thus, we show that prot-sharing may lead to
higher prots for such an industry even if productivity eects are
absent.(JEL L42, J33, J51)
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1 Introduction:
Recent empirical work suggests that prot-sharing in one form or another
is a widespread practice. Smith[12] reports that for the U.K., 21% of com-
panies had at least one all-employee scheme. Blanchower and Oswald [2]
found that in 1984, 40% of the workers in the private manufacturing and non-
manufacturing sector (U.K.) were eligible to participate in a prot-sharing
scheme, and regarding actual participation they found that 25% of workers
were involved in a share-ownership scheme, 20% in a prot-sharing scheme
and 15% in value-added bonus schemes. Freeman and Weitzman[7] observe
that the Japanese bonus system has the essential features of prot sharing,
and is often cited as one main reason why Japanese rms face a less adverse-
rial relationship with their employees as compared to American rms.
Given the prevalence of such schemes one is naturally led to ask the ques-
tion: why are prot-sharing schemes adopted by industries? There have been
some recent attempts to answer this question: some of the theoretical liter-
ature on prot-sharing includes e.g. Weitzmann[16, 17, 18], who in a series
of macro-theoretic papers advocated prot-sharing schemes to help increase
aggregate employment. The interdependence of rms is neglected in this
model, the market being monopolistically competitive. Fung[8], Stewart[14]
and Bensaid and Gary-Bobo[1], on the other hand, use strategic considera-
tions in prot-sharing at the rm level, as the driving force of their models.
In Bensaid and Gary-Bobo, for example, prot-sharing contracts are viewed
as a means of strategic commitment. It is shown that with Cournot competi-
tion in the product market, prot-sharing by a rm is a best response to both
the wage system and prot sharing by other rms, but all rms lose when
they adopt such schemes. Employment increases and output prices decrease.
In contrast we study the eects of a uniform prot share in an oligopolistic
industry that has a single union.
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Indeed, recent evidence on prot sharing (see e.g. Cable and Wilson[3]),
suggests that the introduction of prot sharing will not necessarily have pro-
ductivity enhancing eects unless there are accompanying changes in other
dimensions of organisational design. Wadhwani and Wall[15],also support
this conclusion for a sample of manufacturing rms in the UK. In the ab-
sence of such productivity enhancing eects of prot sharing would rms
adopt such schemes? Our paper answers this question in the aÆrmative if
the setting is an oligopolistic industry with a single union. Moreover we
show that in such a framework prot-sharing schemes have negative eects
on employment and that these negative eects are exacerbated by having a
minimum wage in the industry.
We assume that there is a uniform prot share in the industry. This is
quite reasonable if there is a common (say monopoly) union at the industry
level
1
. We do not model the emergence of this prot-share but take it as
exogenously given. The union decides on total employment, given the prot-
share (since we deal with symmetric rms, and a uniform prot-share, this
is the same as deciding rm level employment). In our model we let the
union unilaterally decide employment, though this is not necessary to the
results. This can be viewed as a special case of the Sequential Bargaining
procedure modelled by Manning([10]). If we assume that the industry has
delegated employment decisions to the union rather than bargaining over
employment, then this can be viewed as the second stage of a sequential
bargaining procedure, with, however the rst stage (wage bargaining) given
exogenously. All that is neededfor our results is that the union have some
1
There is evidence that prot-sharing and centralized negotiations are institutions that
co-exist in many countries. Indeed, in Japan, although the formal insitutions of bargaining
are at the company level, there are eective mechanisms, namely highly co-ordinated em-
ployer's organizations, that ensure a high degree of centralisation in wage setting (Soskice
[13]). For similar reasons we may expect centralisation in the setting of prot-shares.
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bargaining power in setting employment given the wage and prot-share xed
prior to this by the rms.
The main result is that under some plausible conditions (Bertrand) rms
can make higher prots through the introduction of such a prot-sharing
scheme.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces a simple
example of a symmetric Bertrand Oligopoly with linear demand and constant
returns to scale one factor technology that illustrates the main result. The
next section then extends the result to generalised demand, generalised union
objective functions and one factor technology functions with Bertrand rms.
Section 4 concludes with some references to related literature and policy
implications.
2 Linear Demand, CRS and Bertrand Comp-
etition
We consider n identical rms facing a competitive situation. These rms
produce perfectly substitutable commodities for which the inverse market
demand function is given by:
P (x) = A  x (1)
where A > 0; is a constant and x represents total output in the industry. Let
L denote the total employment in the industry,  the total industry prots,
0 <  < 1 the prot share, and w
0
the reservation wage. As mentioned
earlier, we assume wage and prot share to be exogenously given, and we do
not model the process of wage and prot share bargaining. For an illustration
of our main point we rst assume a specic union objective function given
by:
U(r; L) = (r(L)  w
0
)L (2)
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where r(L) = w + 

L
: Hence, the union cares not only about its rents from
their workers' salaries, but also about its share from the industry prots, i.e.
U(r; L) = (w   w
0
)L+ (L) (3)
All rms in the industry possess the same constant returns to scale technol-
ogy, and thus total output given by:
x = BL (4)
with B > 0 is the productivity of labor. Our rst proposition establishes the
conditions under which rms can make positive prots when prot sharing
co-exists with a centralised union which selects aggregate employment.
We assume (w   w
0
) > 0.
Proposition 1: Let the inverse demand function be linear (1), the union's
objective function be (2) above and the technology be one factor constant
returns to scale (4). Bertrand rms make positive prots whenever (w w
0
) <
B(A 
w
B
):
Proof: Given w and ; the union chooses L to maximise U(r; L): The rst
order condition is,
w   w
0
=  
d
dL
implying that:
L

=
A
2B
+
w(1  )  w
0
2B
2
(5)
and 

= [(A BL

)B w)]L

: Note that L

 L
m
= (A 
w
B
)
1
2B
> 0 (since
w   w
0
 0), where L
m
is the employment level that maximizes industry
prots. Thus, for prots to be positive, we need:
(A  BL

)B   w > 0 (6)
Substituting for L

in the above two conditions gives the result. Note that
the second order condition is satised, since
d
2
U
dL
2
= 
d
2

dL
2
=  2B
2
< 0:
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L_m L^* 2L_m L_B+L_cL_c
U(r(L),L)
L
Figure 1: Linear Demand-Wage bill Objective Function

The intuition is as follows. Let L
B
represent the Bertrand level of employ-
ment and L
m
the monopoly level of employment.Observe that (as in gure
1), L
B
=
1
B
(A  
w
B
) = 2L
m
. The condition (AB   w) > (w   w
0
) is
satised i L
B
> L

or L
B
>
(w w
0
)
B
2
. Thus, if the Bertrand level of employ-
ment (at which industry prots are zero) is more than a certain critical level
L
c
=
(w w
0
)
B
2
, then the union gains from restraining employment. This is easy
to understand from the unions objective function given by (3) above. There
is a negative direct eect of restraining employment, since the union values
employment and an indirect positive eect through higher prots. Observe
that
dU
dL
= (w   w
0
) + 
d
dL
; and
d
dL
; is positive until L = L
m
and then de-
creases for L > L
m
. However, the direct eect of changes in employment
on union utility is measured by (w   w
0
) and
dU
dL
may still be positive for
L > L
m
if the direct eect on employement measured by (w   w
0
) is high
enough. Hence the larger is (w   w
0
) the larger is L

compared to L
m
, and
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the lower the prots compared to monopoly level. If (w   w
0
) is too large,
i.e.the union puts a high weight on employment in its objective function,
L

= L
B
and the rm makes zero prots. The rm makes the monopoly
level of prots i L
m
= L

i (w   w
0
) = 0. I.e. if the union does not value
employment (as in Insider objective function models), then Bertrand rms
can achieve the monopoly prots through this delegation scheme. In the
gure above, we assume (w   w
0
) > 0, thus L
m
=
1
2
L
B
; and L

= L
m
+
L
c
2
and L

=
L
B
2
+
L
c
2
.Finally, union utility is zero at L = L
B
+ L
c
.
3 The Generalised Result
In this section, we derive the general conditions for rms to make positive
prots under Bertrand competition. We now use a generalised objective
function for the union:
U(r(L); L) (7)
with the rst derivatives, U
r
and U
L
both strictly positive, and 0 <  < 1.
The inverse demand function is
P (x) with P
0
(x) < 0 (8)
and the one factor technology is given by
x(L) with x
0
(L) > 0 (9)
Let
d
2
U
dL
2
= U
LL
;
d
2
U
dr
2
= U
rr
; and L
u
denote argmaxfU(r(L); L)g. As before r
denotes remuneration per employee, including wage and prot per employee.
Assume
d
2

dL
2
< 0; U
LL
 0; U
rL
 0: Let  =
d
dL
L

denote the elasticity of
prots with respect to employment.
Proposition 2: Let the the union's objective function be given by (7), the one
factor (labour) technology by (9), and the inverse demand function be given
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by (8). Then, Bertrand rms make strictly positive prots i
U
L
U
r
>  
d
dL
L
u
(10)
Proof: The rst order conditions for maximisation of U are:
U
r
r
0
(L) + U
L
= 0 (11)
Let the solution to (11) be given by L

= L
u
; and the corresponding prots
be denoted by 
u
: Then L
u
satises:
U
r
[

L
u
d
dL
 

u
L
u
2
] + U
L
= 0 (12)
i.e. 
u
satises:

u
=
L
2
u
U
r

[U
r

L
u
d
dL
+ U
L
] (13)
at the solution. We can write this as:

u
=
L
2
u
U
L
U
r
(1  )
(14)
Since  > o; for any L < L
B
, the condition (14) is equivalent to requiring
L < L
B
: Given our assumptions U
L
> 0 and U
r
> 0, it is suÆcient then that
(1 ) > 0. Note that  is dened as long as L 6= L
B
: If L
u
 L
m
then   0.
So if L < L
m
; we need  < 1: Observe that the union is interested not in
total prots but in per worker prots, hence the total change in utility due
to a marginal increase in employment consists of two eects: one is a direct
one which increases utility due to the increase in employment and the other
is indirect and is the eect of increased employment on

L
:When L
u
< L
m
an
increase in employment does increase prots but not necessarily

L
and it is
this ratio that depends on the elasticity at L. Thus if elasticity is high, then
a small increase in employment has a large increase in prots and the union
would then want to increase employment till the maximum

L
is reached.
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Thus, we can say that L
u
is at least as high as the L at which this ratio is
maximised. But it could be less than the monopoly level, and the condition
on elasticity then is satised trivially, as the prot function is concave. For
any L
m
< L
u
< L
B
;  < 0; hence again the condition is satised. Thus, as
long as L
u
< L
B
; the conditions are satised.
The special case of linear demand and the specic wage bill objective function
discussed in Section 1 ts in with this result since (10) is equivalent to the
condition (w   w
0
) < B(A 
w
B
):
Finally, We need to verify that the second order conditions are satised:
d
2
U
dL
2
= U
rL
r
0
(L) + U
r
r
00
(L) + U
LL
< 0 (15)
where r
0
(L) =

L
u
d
dL
 

u
L
2
u
; and r
00
(L) =

L
u
d
2

dL
2
 
2
L
u
r
0
(L): Note that at L = L
u
;
r
0
(L) < 0 (from (11)). Thus the SOC's are satised if:
r
0
(L)(U
rL
  2
U
r
L
u
) <  

L
u
U
r
d
2

dL
2
  U
LL
(16)
These are satised under our assumptions.

Suppose we let employment be decided by bargaining between an industry
wide employer's federation and the union. We could e.g. model this using
the Nash bargaining product, as in the second stage of a two stage bargaining
procedure a la Manning ([10]). Then the model here can be interpreted as
a special case of the Nash bargaining solution where the union is delegated
the employment decision. But this intuition will carry through to the more
general model as well, i.e. Bertrand rms could make positive prots if the
union is made to care about prots through a prot sharing scheme. Similarly
the results are conjectured to hold for other types of competion as well, but
this would require us to compute the reservation level of prots to make sure
that the participation constraint for the rms and unions is satised.
9
4 Conclusion
Bonus payments in Japan constitute an average of greater than twenty per-
cent of annual earnings of Japanese workers (Hashimoto [9] ). Moreover the
documented higher productivity of American workers compared to Japanese
raises a question as to why rms would go in for such bonus schemes, if higher
productivity does not result. Among other reasons why this may happen,
our paper is an attempt to answer exactly this type of question.
We showed in this paper that oligopolistic industries may exploit the
institutions of prot-sharing and monopoly unions to collude in the presence
of anti-trust legislation. The bounds of collusion will be set by the objectives
of the union: the more it values employment the lower will be the prots
achieved by the rms. Clearly in the situation we have outlined, the union
has suÆcient incentive to allocate labor to induce capacity constraints, thus
doing away with any need for monitoring by the rms.
While the model is not strictly applicable to Cournot rms, it can in
principle easily be extended to incorporate them as well as to incorporate
asymmetric oligopolies, though in the latter it is only total employment that
is determinate but not its' allocation between rms. In a related paper ([6]),
we show that rms can use \bonus schemes" which specify a bonus that
workers receive if prots are above a certain level. Given that employment
decisions are delegated to a union, Bertrand rms can credibly commit to
choosing monopoly prices.
The idea that unions can be used for strategic interaction between rms
is not new: most papers however concentrate on the issue of barriers to entry.
Dewatripont ([5]) e.g. considers an example where an incumbent rm facing
potential entry signs labor contracts which commit it to excessive post-entry
output. Similarly, in a case described by Williamson ( [19]), United Mine
Workers v Pennington, the main issue was a contract between the union and
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a multi-employer bargaining unit to charge a uniform wage rate to all rms,
regardless of ability to pay. On the other hand, Petrakis and Vlassis ([11])
show that rms may use their unions to become Stackelberg leaders in the
market, via the inclusion of employment into their bargaining agendas.
While unions play the major co-ordinating role in this paper, one could
imagine in general that any intermediate input could fulll this function. In
this sense, our approach parallels the literature on vertical restraints. Em-
pirical evidence in the telecoms industry e.g. suggests that various schemes
are used to encourage suppliers of intermediate goods to carry out practices
that result in increased concentration in downstream rms (access pricing
literature). Most of this literature is however concerned with issues of entry
rather than collusion of existing rms.
We also demonstrated some conditions under which prot-sharing leads
to lower employment, in contrast to the results of Martin Weitzman.
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